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Abstract
This is a review article of the following five recent studies on populism: 1) Ruth Wodak’s The Politics of Fear: What Right-
Wing Populist DiscoursesMean (Sage, 2015); 2) BenjaminMoffitt’s The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style
and Representation (Stanford University Press, 2016); 3) Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser’s Populism: A Very
Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2017); 4) Jan-Werner Müller’sWhat is Populism? (University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2016); and 5) John B. Judis’ The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European
Politics (Columbia Global Reports, 2016). The review argues for a return to early Frankfurt School Critical Theory to address
some of the shortcomings of these studies.
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After a period of quiescence in the postwar decades,
the appeal of right-wing populist movements and parties
has increased steadily in Europe and the U.S. since the
1980s. Although this appeal has ebbed and flowed, the
Great Recession of 2008 reinforced these tendencies, as
demonstrated subsequently by the rise of Tea Party and
Donald Trump’s shocking victory in the 2016 presidential
election in the U.S.; the successful British referendum to
leave the EU; the continued growth and stunning elec-
toral performances of established right-wing populist
parties in Western Europe, such as the French National
Front and the Austrian Freedom Party; and, in Eastern
Europe, the rise to power of right-wing populist parties
in Poland and Hungary. These dramatic events have in-
spired a plethora of new scholarship on populism, which
has moved beyond older debates about the agrarian vs.
urban roots of populism, or whether or not populism is
even a useful term for social scientists (e.g. Gellner &
Ionescu, 1969). More recent scholarly debates have fo-
cused on how to define populism; whether it expands
democracy or represents a threat to it; how new forms
of media abet or inhibit populist movements; whether
or not a charismatic leader is a necessary for a success-
ful populist movement; and whether or not populists are
capable of maintaining power once elected. Not surpris-
ingly, this new literature on populism has been domi-
nated by political scientists, with less frequent contribu-
tions from sociologists and media scholars. In contrast
to the older debates about populism, historians have
been—with some exceptions (e.g. Abromeit, Chesterton,
Marotta, & Norman, 2016; Finchelstein, 2017)—notably
absent. Although scholars who study populism in differ-
ent regions have produced solid comparative studies (e.g.
Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012), truly interdisciplinary ap-
proaches to populism have also been lacking. In what fol-
lows, I will survey a few of the most significant recent
works on populism, with a view to some of the blind
spots produced by the aforementioned peculiarities of
this new wave of scholarship. I will also refer through-
out to the studies of fascism and right-wing populismpro-
duced in the middle decades of the twentieth century by
the Frankfurt School critical theorists. Their truly inter-
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disciplinary approach still offers many valid insights into
the socio-economic roots and social-psychological mech-
anisms that underlie populist movements. Largely forgot-
ten or caricatured today, their studies of populist and
authoritarian movements could still provide an excellent
point of departure for new, interdisciplinary approaches
to populism.
In her study, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing
Populist Discourses Mean, Ruth Wodak draws upon the
“discourse-historical approach” (DHA) to analyze the
main rhetorical strategies used by right-wing populist
parties and politicians. She focuses primarily on Europe,
but also casts an occasional glance at theU.S. and the Tea
Party. Her book was published in 2015, before Donald
Trump’s rise to political power. She spells out briefly the
methodological and theoretical assumptions of the DHA
in the third chapter, thereby justifying her focus through-
out on texts (written, spoken or visual) and the mean-
ings they attain only within specific contexts. She argues
repeatedly that there can be no one single overarching
explanation of the resurgence of right-wing populism in
Europe and the U.S. in the past two decades, and that
right-wing populist discourses have completely different
meanings in different local contexts. At the same time,
however, she does identify certain tendencies that tran-
scend what she calls the “micro-politics” of right-wing
populism. For example, among the books under consid-
eration here, she provides the richest analysis of the
“re-nationalization” of politics in Europe that right-wing
populist parties have both spearheaded and benefited
from. After providing her reader with some basic back-
ground information about right-wing populism and schol-
arly discussions of it in the first two chapters, and her
own theoretical assumptions in chapter three, Wodak
focuses in the next four chapters on four of the most
important content areas of right-wing populist rhetori-
cal “topoi”, namely, nationalism, anti-Semitism, perfor-
mance and the media, and gender. In the concluding
chapter, she ties the various strains of her arguments
together, but also presents an original and provocative
argument about the “Haiderization” of European poli-
tics, to which I will return below. Interspersed unevenly
throughout these eight chapters are a series of 15 “vi-
gnettes”, in which Wodak provides more detailed analy-
sis of right-wing populist texts from specific instances or
debates, such as an interview with British National Party
politician Nick Griffin, in which he discusses accusations
of Holocaust denial, or a series of racist and xenopho-
bic posters supporting the Swiss People’s Party. These
vignettes are undoubtedly one of the main strengths of
Wodak’s study, not only because they give her a chance
to provide the close textual analysis favored by DHA, but
also as a source of empirical case studies, which shed
much light on the differences and similarities between
various right-wing populist parties in Europe.
It is perhaps not a coincidence that Wodak’s discus-
sion of themain content areas of right-wing populism be-
gins with nationalism. Following Theodor Adorno, whose
statement, “identity is the prototype of ideology”, she
cites, Wodak illustrates the creeping “re-nationalization”
of European politics in the past two decades with a dis-
cussion of language, immigration and naturalization poli-
cies. She notes, for example, that in 1998 only six Eu-
ropean states had language and/or citizenship exams,
whereas by 2010 that number had increased to 18, and
by 2013 to 23 (Wodak, 2016, p. 88). She argues that
such tests are repressive insofar as they deny the “ob-
vious fact” that “Europe and the EU have become coun-
tries of immigration, diverse, multilingual and multicul-
tural” (Wodak, 2016, p. 186). Even when right-wing pop-
ulist parties’ success at the ballot box has been limited,
they have had an outsized influence in the resurgence
of nationalism, insofar as mainstream parties have of-
ten taken over their language and even policy propos-
als in order to outflank them politically. This is one as-
pect of what she describes as a “normalization of right-
wing populist policies”, which has had as a consequence
“that almost the entire political spectrum moves to the
right” (Wodak, 2016, p. 184). In the final chapter of her
book she illustrates this process in more detail with an
illuminating discussion of the electoral breakthrough of
the Austrian Freedom Party, which received 27.2% of
the vote in national elections in October 1999—enough
to form a governing coalition the following February
with the Christian-Democratic Austrian People’s Party.
In response, 14 EU member states imposed sanctions
on Austria, but these sanctions were soon lifted and
an EU panel concluded that the new governing coali-
tion did not violate EU law. Wodak argues that these
events were a decisive turning point: “his [Haider’s] as-
cension marks the threshold when right-wing populist
parties started to become acceptable for being inte-
grated into a national government in an EU member
state” (Wodak, 2016, p. 178). Although Wodak makes a
strong case for the “Haiderization of Europe”, her almost
complete neglect of right-wing populism in France and
Italy, begs the question of how Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Na-
tional Front and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forward Italy parties,
which were both influential—albeit in different ways—
before Haider’s electoral breakthrough, also anticipated
and normalized right-wing populist politics in Europe.
In the fifth chapter Wodak makes an intervention in
the ongoing debate about the role of anti-Semitism in
right-wing populist parties and whether or not it has—
as some commentators have recently claimed—been
displaced by Islamophobia among “second-generation”
leaders, such as Marine Le Pen or Heinz Christian Stra-
che, who have arguably distanced their respective par-
ties from the open anti-Semitism of their successors and
have instead moved toward a chauvinistic concept of
“Western Civilization” allegedly under attack by Islam.
Wodak convincingly criticizes this thesis and argues that
anti-Semitism is just as important as ever for right-wing
populist parties in Europe, even if it must now be ex-
pressed in coded forms. She makes clear that Islamo-
phobia and anti-Semitism can and do continue to exist
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side by side. In chapter six Wodak examines the right-
wing populist politics of charisma and their use of tradi-
tional and newer social media. Although she criticizes a
purely psychological concept of charisma, which locates
its source in the exceptional “gifts” of the populist leader,
her own definition of term as mastering specific perfor-
mances in specific contexts remains rather formalistic
and points to the limits of her predominantly linguistic
and text-based approach. In this same chapter she nods
approvingly to the analysis of the “Führer personality” by
Leo Lowenthal—Theodor Adorno’s erstwhile colleague
at the Institute for Social Research. What sets Lowen-
thal and Adorno’s analyses of charisma and authoritar-
ianism apart from her own, however, was their much
more fully developed social-psychological conceptual ap-
paratus. Their combination of the psychoanalytic con-
cept of “identification” with an analysis of the histori-
cally shaped character structures that exist in any given
society, made it possible for them to grasp the actual
emotional mechanisms at work in charisma in a way that
linguistic and textual analysis alone cannot. That said,
Wodak’s careful analysis here of the mendacious rhetori-
cal techniques used by right-wing populist leaders sheds
much light on the subject—and continues felicitously the
tradition of earlier studies along the same lines, such as
Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman’s Prophets of Deceit:
A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator. In
chapter seven Wodak turns her attention to an aspect
of right-wing populist rhetoric that has often been ne-
glected by other commentators: gender. She notes that
moremen—andmore working-class men, in particular—
vote for right-wing populist parties than do women, es-
pecially in Western Europe. At the same time, she offers
a nuanced and compelling explanation of why women
occupy important leadership roles in many of the par-
ties in both Europe and the U.S. In more secular West-
ern Europe, Marine Le Pen and Pia Kjaersgaard focus
on the hijab or burqa wearing Muslim as the primary
symbol of the threat Islam poses to “Western” ideals
of gender equality, whereas in the more Christian U.S.
populist politicians like Sarah Palin and Michelle Bach-
man view abortion and even contraception as threats to
the traditional, white patriarchal family. Drawing once
again on Adorno,Wodak argues that the reactionary atti-
tudes towards gender characteristic of many right-wing
populist male voters are linked—in both Europe and the
U.S.—to the real and perceived loss of status of white
working-class men since the 1970s and that these atti-
tudes co-exist and reinforce other aspects of the “syn-
drome” of the authoritarian personality, such as ethno-
centrism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.
In The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Politi-
cal Style, and Representation, BenjaminMoffitt (2016) at-
tempts to stake out an innovative interpretation of pop-
ulism as a political style, whose essence lies primarily in
mediated performances by leaders and not in specific
content or ideology. Moffitt also attempts to move be-
yond the limits of most recent commentary on populism
by addressing it as a truly global phenomenon, with com-
mon characteristics everywhere. To make good on his
claim for global coverage, he uses as case studies 28 pop-
ulist leaders from around the world. The other main way
in which Moffitt tries to set his study apart from the vo-
luminous older and newer literature on populism lies in
his focus on the dramatic transformation of the media in
the past two decades and its effects upon politics. Mof-
fitt argues that populism is qualitatively different today
because of the new media, and that the new media has
benefited and advanced populism more than any other
form of politics.
Moffitt begins with an overview of the literature on
populism, in which he discerns four distinct approaches:
populism as an ideology, a political strategy, a discourse
or rhetoric, or a political logic. He proceeds to explain
how his own interpretation of populism as a political
style differs from these approaches. According to him, all
forms of populism appeal to “the people” against “the
elite”; they flaunt bad manners and flout politically cor-
rect forms of behavior; and they seek to mobilize sup-
porters with hyperbolic warnings about existing or immi-
nent crises and threats. Furthermore, populism differs
from genuine political ideologies, such as liberalism or
socialism, in that it relies much less on stable principles
than on specific ways of performing politics. He argues
that, for populists, politics is more about how the mes-
sage is delivered than the actual message itself. Mof-
fitt cites approvingly the “constructivist” and “performa-
tivist” turns in the social sciences as informing his posi-
tion. He notes as an advantage of his approach the abil-
ity to recognize “the populist style in politics” in many
different contexts, and across the traditional divisions
between the left and the right. Consequently, Moffitt
makes no effort to distinguish left- and right-wing forms
of populism. Instead, he contrasts populism as a whole
to non-populist forms of politics, such pluralism and es-
pecially technocracy, whose appeal to expertise, good
manners and stability he views as the diametric opposite
of populism.
In chapter four of his study, Moffitt turns his atten-
tion to the much-debated role of the leader in populism.
He argues—against Cas Mudde and others—that down-
playing the role of the leader betrays a Eurocentric ap-
proach to populism; the centrality of the leader to pop-
ulist movements and parties is the rule, rather than the
exception, when one views populism as a global phe-
nomenon. For Moffitt, “it is the leader that should be
our main focus when studying the phenomenon, given
that they are the figures that ultimately ‘do’ populism”
(Moffitt, 2016, pp. 51–52). Populism differs from tradi-
tional political ideologies also in that the leader does
not represent but actually embodies “the people”. But,
as Moffitt points out insightfully, charisma is not nec-
essary to become a living symbol of the “general will”;
more important are convincing “performances of ordi-
nariness and outsiderness”, which make it possible for
people to identify with the leader. Moffitt states that
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he agrees with Freud’s theory of group psychology, ac-
cording towhich such “symbolic unification of the group”
functions as a process of identification, although he does
not discuss the process of introjection, which leads to
the formation of libidinal bonds between the leader and
his/her followers.1 Moffitt’s reference to Freud here is
isolated and social-psychological categories of any kind
are absent in the remainder of his book. As withWodak’s
discourse-analytical approach,Moffitt’s emphasis on the
media and performance provides few conceptual tools
that could explain why certain political techniques are
successful, while others fail. To his credit, Moffitt at-
tempts to address this problem in chapter six, which
focuses on the audience for populism. Qualifying his
claim in chapter four somewhat about the primacy of the
leader, Moffitt admits here that not all attempts to per-
form populism are successful and the populist subject is
not simply “interpellated” in a passive way, but has an
active role in choosing which performances it accepts,
through individuals’ decision to listen or not, or to join
or vote for specific parties. Although Moffitt is certainly
correct to emphasize that the relationship between the
populist leader and his or her supporters is thoroughly
mediated—not direct—his own concept of mediation re-
mains unmediated insofar as it focuses solely on me-
dia performances and not the larger social and histori-
cal context in which those performances occur. His in-
vocation of Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle here
to support his claims demonstrates clearly Moffitt’s in-
adequate mediation of media appearance with social re-
ality. For Debord—thoroughly schooled in Hegel, Marx
and Lukács—the “spectacle” was precisely not just the
media, but rather the most advanced form of a capital-
ist society, in which even images have been seized by
the commodity form. Moffitt has good insights into the
key role that carefully constructed, mythical images of
“the people” play in the populist ideological repertoire,
but he lacks the conceptual tools to decipher such so-
cial heiroglyphics.
In chapter seven, Moffitt shifts back to a more con-
structivist argument, with a critique of commentators
who posit a strong, or even weak causal link between
crises and populism. Against them, Moffitt views “crisis
as a phenomenon that can be experienced only through
mediated performance” (Moffitt, 2016, p. 118) and he
avers that “a crisis only becomes a crisis when it is per-
ceived as a crisis” (Moffit, 2016, p. 120, emphasis his
own). One wonders if the legions of persons who lost
their jobs and homes after the Great Crash in 1929 or
the Great Recession in 2008—which led directly to an
upsurge of left- and right-wing populist movements in
Europe and the U.S.—just needed to adjust their percep-
tions.Moffitt does have aworthwhile point tomake here,
namely, that the performance of crisis is essential to the
populist’s cultivation and manipulation of fear among
its audience, but severing the link completely from real
social crises and populism goes too far. In the penul-
timate chapter Moffitt turns his attention to debates
about whether populism is good or bad for democracy.
After a brief, but lucid outline and analysis of the main
positions of the threemain camps—thosewho view pop-
ulism as a threat to democracy, those who view it as a
deepening of democracy, and those who take an equiv-
ocal approach—Moffitt sides with those who remain ag-
nostic and insists that populism will have different con-
sequences in different contexts. Incongruously, he criti-
cizes Cas Mudde—whom he correctly places in the third
camp—for not making his normative commitment to lib-
eral democracy and pluralism clear enough, while at the
same time arguing that populism often serves as a cor-
rective to overly liberal conceptions of democracy. Mof-
fitt’s elaboration of the positive and negative effects pop-
ulism can have in different contexts is illuminating, but it
would seem that his own normative commitments are
weaker than Mudde’s. Moffit concludes with the unde-
niable observation that populism has experienced a re-
vival on a global scale in the past few decades and that
it is here to stay. His other parting claim, that analyses
of populism must keep pace with times, is well taken, al-
though his own passing and underdeveloped reference
to Freud can also serve as a reminder that “older” con-
ceptual approaches to populism and group psychology
should not be consigned to the proverbial dustbin of his-
tory. As anyone who has suffered through The Triumph
of theWill knows, right-wing populists’ discovery of “new
media” long predates the twenty-first century.
In Populism: A Very Short Introduction, one can find a
useful distillation of the reflections of two veteran schol-
ars of populism, Cas Mudde and Cristobál Rovira Kalt-
wasser (2017). The former is a leading authority on right-
wing populist parties in Europe and the latter an expert
on populism in Latin America, although both have also
published comparative studies of populism in different
regions. Parting ways immediately with those who re-
ject populism as a merely polemical term, or one too
vague to be helpful for scholarly analysis, the authors ar-
gue that it is possible to provide a minimal definition of
populismwhich grasps its common features across space
and time, and distinguishes it from other political move-
ments, parties and/or ideologies. Accordingly, they de-
fine populism as a “thin-centered ideology” which neces-
sarily includes three core concepts. They use “ideology”
as a neutral, not an inherently pejorative term,more akin
to a “worldview” than “false consciousness”. By “thin-
centered” they refer to the fact that populism is less com-
prehensive than other political “ideologies”, such as liber-
alism or socialism,whichmakes it possible, indeed neces-
sary, for populism to be combined with other ideologies
in order to become an effective political force. The three
core concepts that define populism, according to them,
are “the people”, “the elite”, and “the general will”. Fol-
lowing or alluding to Ernesto Laclau, they refer to the first
1 For an insightful discussion of the pyschoanalytic concept of identification and its relevance to contemporary right-wing populist movements, see (Leeb,
in press).
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two concepts as “empty signifiers”, which means that
onemust examine the particular incarnation of populism
in a local context to determine how the opposition be-
tween “the people” and “the elite” is constructed. With
the concept of “the general will”, they allude, of course,
to Rousseau and his critique of representative govern-
ment, but also to what they refer to as the “monist core
of populism” (p. 18), which brings populism into close
proximity with the later, right-wing and (proto-)fascist
political theory of Carl Schmitt. Mudde and Kaltwasser’s
choice of Rousseau and Schmitt to illustrate the theo-
retical underpinnings of populism raises the question of
the relationship of populism to classical republicanism,
but also the question of the historical transformation of
populism from a left- to a right-wing ideology between
the French Revolution and the emergence of fascism and
other new, radical right-wingmovements in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century; but they don’t pur-
sue these important questions here.2 In any case, the
“monist” character of populism highlights its inherent
preference for a purported “general will” over any indi-
vidual or minority rights. Later in the book, they also de-
fine populism as compatible with democracy, but a po-
tential threat to liberal democracy. Finally, they also de-
fine their approach to populism as “ideational”; for them,
in other words, “populism is first and foremost a set of
ideas” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 62), which can be
used in different ways by different actors. This approach
has the advantage of permitting them to move beyond
sterile debates about whether populism is primarily a
movement or a party, or whether populism is tied to a
specific type of leader, or to a leader at all.
In the second chapter the authors examine briefly
the changing forms of populism that have existed in dif-
ferent regions of the globe in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries. They provide a good overview of the
transformation of populism in the U.S. over the course
of the twentieth century from a predominatly progres-
sive, to a predominantly reactionary movement—here
again, however, without any attempt to explain why this
shift occurred. They also helpfully point to the central-
ity of producerism, which defines “the people” as vir-
tuous producers and “the elite” as immoral parasites,
to both progressive and reactionary forms of populism
in the U.S. They approach Latin American populism
by way of a historical periodization that distinguishes
threemainwaves: classical populism (1929–1969), repre-
sented paradigmatically by Juan Peron; neo-liberal pop-
ulism (the 1990s), represented by Alberto Fujimoro and
Carlos Menem; and left-wing populism (1998 to the
present), represented by Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales.
Their historical narrative of European populism begins
with the Russian narodniki movement, which was itself
unsuccessful, but which inspired several successful agrar-
ian populist movements in Eastern Europe. Problemati-
cally, they erect a firewall between fascism and populism
by claiming rather simplistically that fascism was an eli-
tist movement. Here they overlook the crucial anti-elitist
elements of fascist ideology, which set it apart from tra-
ditional European conservatism and made it so appeal-
ing the new radical nationalist movements that had be-
gun to emerge in France, Germany and other European
countries at the end of the nineteenth century. These
movements should be seen as key sources of twentieth-
century European populism—and not just the Russian
narodniki. They point out correctly that populism disap-
peared almost entirely in Europe in the prosperous post-
World War II decades, and did not reemerge as a force
to be reckoned with until the end of the 1990s. Strik-
ing from our perspective today in relationship to both
Europe and the U.S., where populism also languished
in relative obscurity in the post-war period, is the cor-
relation between the Keynesian economic policies and
stronger welfare state, on the one hand, and the notable
absence of populism, on the other. The correlation be-
tween the resurgence of populism in the 1990s and the
spread of neo-liberal ideas that preceded and accom-
panied it, is equally striking. It is even more striking if
one views the conservative shift in Western European
politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s—represented
by Thatcher in Britain or Kohl and the Tendenzwende
in West Germany—as the watershed moment in the re-
crudescence of populism, rather than the late 1990s, as
do the authors. Who would deny that the former shift
was also characterized by a powerful resurgence of the
xenophobia that would figure so prominently in later Eu-
ropean populist movements?Mudde and Kaltwasser are
open to arguments that posit not merely correlation, but
causal links between the rise of neo-liberalism and right-
wing populism in Europe and the U.S., but it is—as we
shall see—John Judis who explores these links most com-
pellingly. Mudde and Kaltwasser also mention in pass-
ing populist movements in other parts of the globe—
thereby agreeing with Moffitt that populism is truly a
global phenomenon—but with the limited amount of
space allotted to them in a “very short introduction”,
their discussion remains necessarily superficial.
Chapter three provides an analytically sharp and use-
ful discussion of the three main types of populist mo-
bilization: top–down personalist leadership, bottom–up
social movements and the mixed form of the politi-
cal party. Mudde brings his formidable knowledge of
European right-wing populist parties to bear here, to
demonstrate—pace Moffitt—that populist parties can
not only thrivewithout charismatic leaders, but that such
charisma is often a function of the much more durable
party form. In chapter four Kaltwasser offers a plausible
explanation of how and why the charismatic strongman
has been so successful in the Latin American context, but
he and Mudde also explain that such a leader is one of
several types that have proven successful in populist par-
ties and movements. Other types include women, en-
trepreneurs, ethnic leaders or “insider-outsiders” who
can succeed in gaining acceptance as the “vox populi”.
2 For an examination of this problem, see (Abromeit, 2016).
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Although they distinguish helpfully between different
types of leaders, they seem to agree with Wodak and
Moffitt that all forms of populist leadership involve a
process of identification between the supporters and
the leader. Mudde and Kaltwasser point out that not
all populist leaders are charismatic. And sometimes, it is
precisely this lack of charisma which facilitates the pro-
cess of identification. But Mudde and Kaltwasser do not
possess any sophisticated psychological concepts to ex-
plain such processes of identification, any more than do
Wodak or Moffitt.
In the last two chapters of their short study, the au-
thors turn to debates about populism and democracy,
and to the causes of and possible responses to populism.
In contrast to Jan-Werner Müller, they do believe that
populism can enhance democracy under certain circum-
stances. Displaying once again their analytical acumen,
the authors distinguish between four different types
of regimes—full authoritarianism, competitive authori-
tarianism, electoral democracy and liberal democracy—
and demonstrate how populism is more likely to bene-
fit democracy under repressive conditions than in a fully
open society. They also identify the many ways in which
populism can strengthen anti-liberal-democratic tenden-
cies. One problem, however, with this typology is that it
posits liberal democracy as the most perfect form of gov-
ernment possible.With this approach, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to understandwhy powerful anti-democratic
populist forces develop within liberal democracies. This
approach may reflect the limits of political science itself,
as a discipline, to provide a comprehensive explanation
of right-wing populism, and the need for a more inter-
disciplinary approach, such as that pioneered by Frank-
furt School Critical Theorists in the 1930s and 1940s.3 On
this same note, Mudde and Kaltwasser begin the sixth
and final chapter with the rather surprising statement
that, despite the recent explosion of research and writ-
ing on populism, “surprisingly few established theories
about the success (and failure) of populist forces exist”
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 97). Like Wodak, they do
not seem to believe that there is any single explanation
for populism, or even for its global resurgence in the
past few decades. They provide a laundry list of condi-
tions, whose existence facilitates populism, such as a per-
ception of threat or crisis, economic downturn, system-
atic corruption, a weak state unable to collect taxes or
redistribute wealth, and an increasingly diversified and
competitive media market that focuses more on the sen-
sational issues favored by populists. One of the other
causes they mention, namely, the “neo-liberalization of
social democracy”, that is, the tendency of Socialists and
Social Democrats on the Continent, Labor in Britain, and
the Democratic Party in the U.S. to embrace neo-liberal
economic policies and thereby to abandon any princi-
pled opposition to the root cause of growing inequality
and insecurity in modern capitalist societies, points to a
more comprehensive explanation of the resurgence of
populism, but the authors do not develop this idea. The
closest they come to a general explanation of the causes
of populism is that “many citizens interpret political real-
ity through the lens of populism” (Mudde & Kaltwasser,
2017, p. 97), which of course begs the question of why.
To come back once more to the Frankfurt School theo-
rists, at least they realized that questions of perception
could be linked to socially and historically formed char-
acter structures, which were widespread among groups
of individuals who shared common experiences.4 Such
an approach offers the possibility of studying and ex-
plaining the reasons why specific forms of perception,
and beyond that, specific emotional dispositions, exist
among numerically significant groups. These perceptions
and dispositions can provide the cement that holds so-
cieties together, or—in the case of populist rebellions—
the destructive energy that can transform or tear them
apart. Mudde and Kaltwasser end their study with some
sound recommendations on how best to counteract the
negative effects of populism, which include adequate
prosecution for corruption; a stronger state able to col-
lect taxes and redistribute wealth; political and civic ed-
ucation in liberal-democratic values; support for domes-
tic and international institutions that monitor and pro-
tect minority rights; and defense of free media. But they
also caution that it is a mistake to overreact to the per-
ceived threat of populism, thereby playing into their self-
presentation as victims of powerful forces and violat-
ing oneself the democratic principle of the “freedom of
those who think differently”.
Jan-Werner Müller’s What is Populism? (2016) parts
ways from the other books under consideration here pri-
marily in its attempt to define populism as an exclusively
negative phenomenon, which always represents a poten-
tial threat to democracy. To make this argument Müller
must also rely on an atypical concept of democracy,
in which liberal safeguards to individual and minority
rights are included in the definition of the term.Whereas
Mudde and Kaltwasser distinguish between democracy
and liberal democracy, viewing populism as compatible
with the first and a potential threat only to the sec-
3 As Adorno put it: “It cannot be disputed that formal democracy, under the present economic system, does not suffice to guarantee permanently, to
the bulk of the population, satisfaction of the most elementary wants and needs, whereas at the same time the democratic form of government is pre-
sented as if…it were as close to an ideal society as it could be. The resentment caused by this contradiction is turned by those who fail to recognize its
economic roots against the form of democracy itself. Because it does not fulfill what it promises, they regard it as a ‘swindle’ and are ready to exchange
it for a system which sacrifices all claims to human dignity and justice, but of which they expect vaguely some kind of guarantee of their lives by better
planning and organization” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950, p. 678).
4 See, for example (Horkheimer, 1995a). Erich Fromm’s very substantial introductory essay to the Institute’s Studies on Authority and Family (Fromm,
1936) also provides an excellent and still relevant model for a sophisticated understanding of the social psychological mechanisms at work in right-wing
populist movements. Unfortunately, this important essay has never been translated into English. For a brilliant socio-historical analysis of populist
movements in early modern Europe, see also (Horkheimer, 1995b). Horkheimer and Fromm’s writings in the 1930s laid the theoretical groundwork for
the Institute’s path-breaking empirical studies of right-wing populism and authoritarianism in the 1940s and 1950s.
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ond, Müller denies the claims of populists in power—
such as Viktor Orban, Hugo Chavez, or Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan—to be truly democratic. Müller introduces a
new term, “defective democracies”, to refer to these
regimes,whose success inwinning elections is, according
to him, not enough to earn them democratic legitimacy.
Müller also parts ways frommost other commentators—
such as Moffitt, who argues that populism is successful
only in the opposition and tends to collapse if it gains
power—in his much greater attention to what populists
do when they are in power. Also in contrast to many
other scholars of populism, Müller emphasizes the sim-
ilarities between fascist and populist ideology. Regard-
ing these last two points of divergence, Müller’s analy-
sis of populism is informed in illuminating ways by his
impressive earlier research on Carl Schmitt, the history
of political ideas in twentieth-century Europe, and his
more recent work on the Orban regime in Hungary. For
example,Müller convincingly demonstrates that contem-
porary right-wing populists operate with a monolithic
and imaginary concept of “the people”, which echoes
both Schmitt’s definition of the political in terms of a
binary “friend–enemy” opposition and the National So-
cialists’ appeal to amythical Volksgemeinschaft. Contem-
porary populists’ appeals to such imagined communities
allow them to claim that they represent the “real” peo-
ple and to exclude those defined as outsiders. ForMüller,
the “logic” of populism always rests on the self-righteous
assumption by populist leaders and followers that “we
are the 100%”. In most cases, however, it is—according
to him—the populist leader who speaks in the name of
the people. One additional consequence ofMüller’s thor-
oughly critical approach to populism is that progressive
populism becomes a contradictio in adjecto; for example,
he argues that the People Party in the U.S. in the 1890s
was social democratic, not populist, and he says basically
the same thing about Bernie Sanders. No doubt, Mudde
and Kaltwasser’s approach, which makes room for pro-
gressive, bottom–up forms of populism, is more supple
here. But Müller’s approach has the advantage of captur-
ing one decisive aspect of right-wing populism thatmany
commentators have overlooked, namely, its tendency to
depoliticize its followers and to reduce democracy to
a spectacle, in which passive citizens do nothing more
than watch or listen to their leaders. Populism can be as
much about demobilizing, as mobilizing “the masses”, as
Schmitt and the Nazis also knew. For populists, popular
sovereignty is more acclamatory than participatory. This
also helps explain why populism often appeals to people
who hate politics.
There is much to recommend in Müller’s study, par-
ticularly in regard to his trenchant and sobering analysis
of populism in power. But I would like briefly to discuss
two weaknesses I see in his approach, which he shares
with Mudde and Kaltwasser. The first is his positing of
liberal democracy as the unquestionable telos ofmodern
politics. Here, Müller goes even further thanMudde and
Kaltwasser by uttering some cautious words of praise for
Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” argument, that is,
“that there were no more rivals to liberal democracy at
the level of ideas” (Müller, 2016, p. 5). As he sees it, the
main danger to liberal democracy comes not from rival
ideologies, but from within democracy itself, in the form
of populism. Although Müller does recognize through-
out his study the link between increasing inequality and
the resurgence of populism—he goes so far to say that
the U.S. “requires deep structural reform in this respect”
(Müller, 2016, p. 93)—the question is whether or not he
possesses the conceptual tools to grasp the reasons why
liberal democracy has come increasingly under threat,
from within, during the past few decades. Here, an ever-
renewed emphasis on the virtues of liberal democracy
itself does not get us very far. Adorno’s famous state-
ment in 1959 that the survival of authoritarian tenden-
cies within democracy is more menacing than groups
openly opposed to democracy, is still relevant—despite
the different social and historical context in which we are
living today (Adorno, 1998, p. 90). Müller is too quick to
caricature and dismiss social-psychological explanations
of populism, such as Adorno and his colleagues’ analy-
ses of the authoritarian personality. As is the case with
the other books considered here,Müller accepts that the
psychological mechanism of identification is decisive in
the dynamic interaction of the populist leader and his
or her supporters. What does liberal democratic polit-
ical theory have to tell us about this mechanism? Not
much, I claim. Furthermore, here also like Mudde and
Kaltwasser, Müller does not pay enough attention to the
fundamental differences and incompatibility between
democratic socialist andMarxist theory, on the one hand,
and populism, on the other. While it would take us too
far afield to discuss this complex point in any detail here,
the case of Ernesto Laclau is very instructive in this re-
gard. In his brilliant early work, Laclau sought to develop
a synthesis of critical Marxist theory and populism. But
as his work developed, and Laclau’s defense of populism
as the “ontological” foundation of politics, went hand in
hand with a rejection of Marxist and socialist theory, in-
sofar as they insisted that politics must always be the-
orized within a larger social and historical context. This
insistence upon the primacy of the “social”, and the com-
patibility of socialism and populism was precisely what
the later Laclau rejected. Not surprisingly, Müller is him-
self explicitly critical of Laclau, yet he—like Mudde and
Kaltwasser—approach populism as a fundamentally po-
litical phenomenon, and make little effort to systemat-
ically explore the socio-historical and social psychologi-
cal factors that have determined its success. To his credit,
Müller emphasizes that not all criticisms of liberalism are
populist. Presumably he is leaving the door open here for
a criticalMarxist critique of theways inwhich social dom-
ination reproduces itselfwithin liberal democracy—a cri-
tique which is not populist, but democratic socialist. But
one will not find such a critique in Müller’s own work. In-
sofar as many people on the left—including Laclau and
those influenced by him—have been drawn to populism,
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the development of such a critique remains an impor-
tant task.
Of all the books under consideration here, John
Judis’s The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession
TransformedAmerican and European Politics (2016), con-
tributes most to the development of such a critique. Al-
though somewhat misleading, insofar as Judis’s discus-
sion of populism extends back historically far beyond
the Great Recession of 2008, the title of his book high-
lights one of its main strengths, namely, an approach to
the recent resurgence of populism that is more histori-
cal and historically specific than any of the other books
under consideration here. Although Judis draws upon
political theory—most notably, Ernesto Laclau’s empha-
sis on the fundamentally antagonistic nature of populist
politics—to flesh out some of his arguments, at the cen-
ter of his analysis are deeper socio-economic tendencies
and ideologies that have accompanied and reinforced
them. He focuses, in particular, on the transition in Eu-
rope and the U.S. in 1980s and 1990s from industrial so-
cieties governed by more or less Keynesian policies, to
post-industrial societies in which neo-liberal ideas and
policies had become hegemonic, even among the main-
stream leftist parties. Judis views the resurgence of pop-
ulism in the past few decades primarily as an expres-
sion of discontent with neo-liberal policies. So, during
periods when neo-liberalism seemed to function well,
such as the late 1990s, populism lost support. At other
times—most notably in the wake of the 2008 crisis—
left and right-wing populist movements exploded in Eu-
rope and the U.S. Judis argues compellingly that pop-
ulist movements “often function as warning signs of
a political crisis” and that they arise “only under very
special circumstances” (p. 16), which explains why—as
most of the other authors also noted—populism was so
weak in Europe and the U.S. during the prosperous post-
war decades. The populist movements and parties that
did exist in Europe during this time—such as the Pou-
jadistes in France—were libertarian, anti-tax parties sup-
ported by the petty bourgeoisie. Judis shows interest-
ingly how many European right-wing populist parties—
such as the National Front in France, which had its roots
in Poujadisme—followed a trajectory from libertarian-
ism to economic nationalism and pro-welfare state posi-
tion.With the numbers of immigrants and refugees rising
steadily, especially in Northern Europe, right-wing pop-
ulist parties insisted that the benefits of welfare state
policies accrue solely to the “real” people, namely, those
within the imagined ethno-nationalist community. Judis
also demonstrates a more general tendency in the shift-
ing composition of supporters of European right-wing
populist parties, with the petty bourgeois being increas-
ingly outnumbered by workers, and especially workers
in regions hit hardest by neo-liberal economic reforms of
the 1980s and 1990s. Even relative latecomers to the Eu-
ropean right-wing populist scene, such as UKIP in Britain,
offer a clear example of this larger pattern outlined by
Judis. He argues that UKIP’s electoral breakthrough in the
2014 EU election, in which it came in first with 27.5%
of the vote, was predicated upon Nigel Farage’s aban-
donment of the party’s commitment to laissez-faire eco-
nomics, which increased support from workers, espe-
cially older, white male workers in former industrial ar-
eas. He identifies similar tendencies in other right-wing
populist parties in Northern Europe. He argues, for exam-
ple, thatMarine Le Pen—whose home district is a former
mining region in Northern France—is more of an eco-
nomic nationalist than her father and that her economic
policies aremore important to the current success of the
National Front than anti-immigration.
Equally impressive and persuasive is Judis’ discussion
of the role of the “neo-liberalization of social democracy”
in the rise of right-wing populism in Europe and the U.S.
Although, as he points out, both center-left and center-
right mainstream parties embraced the neo-liberal poli-
cies that became hegemonic in the 1980s and 1990s,
such a shift had different implications for the left. Ev-
eryone is familiar with Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, as the
paradigmatic cases of such a shift, but Judis also shows
how Continental Social Democracy and Socialism par-
ticipated in the same dynamic from the early 1980s to
the present. From Francois Mitterrand’s major conces-
sions to neo-liberalism in the early 1980s, to Gerhard
Schroeder’s defense of the so-called Hartz laws in 2003,
which made it easier to fire workers, to the Spanish
and Greek socialist parties’ more recent embrace of EU-
mandated austerity policies, Judis demonstrates a consis-
tent and recurring pattern of the neo-liberalization of So-
cial Democratic parties across Western and Southern Eu-
rope. This pattern was reinforced by the EU, which “wit-
tingly or not…institutionalized the rule of neo-liberalism”
(Judis, 2016, p. 105) and thereby exerted heavy pressure
on Social Democratic and Socialist parties to toe the line.
Implied, but never explicitly stated in Judis’ argument, is
the rather obvious point that if traditional leftist parties,
with deep roots in the European universalist traditions of
emancipation going back to the French Revolution and
socialist movements of the nineteenth-century, fail to ar-
ticulate a robust critique of neo-liberal global capitalism,
then the door is thrown wide open to right-wing pop-
ulist parties, who are more than willing to criticize neo-
liberal globalization from a particularist—that is, ethno-
nationalist and xenophobic—point of view. Thus, if one
takes Judis’ arguments seriously—as one should—much
of the responsibility for the rise of right-wing populism
in Europe and the U.S. must be placed squarely at the
feet of the Democratic, Labor, Social Democratic and So-
cialist parties that have failed in this regard. As Judis also
points out, such a dynamic also explains the seemingly
“surprising” success of left-wing populist movements in
the U.S and Europe since 2008—such as Syriza in Greece
(before it accepted austerity policies), Podemos in Spain,
and Bernie Sanders in the U.S.—which have articulated
robust critiques of neo-liberal capitalism and the mas-
sive inequality it has created. The election of Donald
Trump, who ran his campaign on economic populism
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and promised to transform the Republican Party into a
“workers’ party”, is also much less surprising if one is
willing—unlike Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party
leadership—to accept the obvious fact that the Great
Recession thoroughly discredited neo-liberal policies. As
Judis points out, the success of both Trump and Sanders
“showed how much the Great Recession had radicalized
significant parts of the electorate…the contrast couldn’t
have been sharper with Clinton’s campaign that lacked
any visionary component” (Judis, 2016, pp. 83–84, 86).
Judis concludes his study by arguing—correctly—
that we should not simply dismiss right-wing populists
asmisguided, because they are addressing genuine prob-
lems. The problem, however, is to understand why the
manner in which they address these genuine problems is
indeed misguided, and why such a misguided approach
has become so appealing. I have suggested here that
contemporary approaches to the study of populism that
rely predominantly on discourse analysis, new media, or
even political theory are not adequate to the task. Prefer-
able, in my view, would be a return to the sophisticated,
interdisciplinary approach to the study of populism that
was pioneered by the Frankfurt School Critical Theorists
in the 1930s and 1940s, in which a non-dogmatic Marx-
ist critique of capitalism, psychoanalytically based social
psychology and empirical social research were combined
to grasp the powerful right-wing populist tendencies that
emerged in the twentieth century. To be sure, their ideas
would need to be updated to reflect contemporary so-
cial conditions, and should also draw upon theoretical in-
sights gained by othermore recent approaches. But, with
the partial exception of John Judis, contemporary studies
of populism seem better at describing than actually ex-
plaining the ominous resurgence of right-wing populism
in Europe and the U.S. in recent times.
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